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On December 2, 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) a national nonprofit organization 
working to get actual legal rights for members of nonhuman species filed a lawsuit in Fulton 
County, New York petitioning the judges for a writ of habeas corpus.  A habeas corpus allows 
for a person being held captive to be brought before a court to determine if their imprisonment is 
lawful. Habeas corpus suits are filed all the time; what made this one historic was that it was not 
filed for a human being. The writ in question asked the court to formally recognize that a 26 year 
old chimpanzee named Tommy was a person, possessing the legal right to not be bodily detained 
against his will.
2
 One day later, the NhRP filed a similar suit in Niagara Falls, and two days after 
that a third one on Long Island.  
All three lawsuits failed,
3
 with all three judges declining to sign the order. One judge held 
a hearing to explain that while he is indeed an animal lover, he just could not or apply NY Code-
Article 70: Habeas Corpus to a chimpanzee.
4
 Another judge, on a phone hearing, was 
sympathetic to the cause, but did not want to “be the one to make that leap of faith.” 
5
  Still, 
regardless of the outcome, the reasoning behind the lawsuit is quite simple; the NhRP and its 
supporters believe that the line between ‘persons’ and ‘nonpersons’ should not be as sharply 
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drawn as it is now. They believe that the current division is artificial and superficial; a line that 
focuses on microscopic differences in DNA rather than on important and meaningful 
characteristics, qualities, and emotions that species other than humans might well share. 
  
2. Law and Religion for Nonhuman Persons 
 
Although this idea might seem somewhat radical at first glance, from a moral/philosophical 
perspective these arguments are not that novel. Animal rights and line-drawing have long been a 
contemplative problem for great thinkers,
6
 and legal theorists.
7
 For many, at least in theory it 
actually seems almost illogical to deny a complex, autonomous, self-aware creature, capable of 
communicating its desires, the ability to live as it wishes, simply because it looks different. In the 
words of philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse, for instance; 
‘[s]peciesism ... is just like ... racism. Racists think that, for instance, the death or 
enslavement of someone of their own race matters, but that the death or 
enslavement of someone of a different race does not, despite the fact that a 
difference in skin colour does not make for a difference in how much one wants 
to live or be free, or how worthwhile one’s life might be, or anything else 
relevant. Similarly, ... a speciesist [thinks] that the death or enslavement of a 
member of their own species matter[s], but that the death or enslavement of a 
member of a different species ... d[oes] not, despite the (imagined) fact that the 
difference in species does not make for a difference in how much the two beings 
want to live or be free, or how worthwhile their lives might be.’
8
 
What the question boils down to then isn’t whether or not animals are ‘human’; they’re not, and 
there is nothing wrong with that. The question is really about whether or not nonhuman beings 
can be ‘legal persons,’ entitled to human rights. To have legal personality is simply to be capable 
of having rights and duties.
9
 American courts have long held that the answer to the question of 
whether or not nonhuman beings can be legal persons is, at least in some instances, yes.
10
 In fact, 
the Supreme Court has just agreed to hear a case about whether or not nonhuman ‘persons.’ i.e. 
in this case corporations, should be entitled to religious legal rights and protections.
11
 Whether 
we are talking about corporations or animals,
12
 extending the idea of personhood requires a 
fundamental shift in perspective. And in dealing with such a weighty issue, core to our own 
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understanding of the world, it makes sense to at least consider what religion might have to say 
about the matter. 
It has been argued that human rights
13
 themselves are ‘ineliminably religious’ in nature, 
since the idea of the human person as “sacred” -foundational to human rights thinking- is itself 
inescapably religiously based.
14
 The worth and dignity of the human being is fundamental to the 
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions and could be illustrated in hundreds of ways, of which 
the pre-eminent one is the sense (and Scripturally supported assertion) that people are made in 
the image of God, endowed with rationality, choice, a capacity to pray, a capacity to love, and a 
moral consciousness.
15
 When asked to formulate the main principle behind all of Judaic law, 
Rabbi Akiba famously said that it is to “Love (and respect) your neighbor as you do yourself.”
16
 
Challenged to sum up all of Jewish Law in just one sentence, Hillel the Elder confidently replied 
“That which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow. That is the whole of Jewish law, the rest 
is explanation.”
17
 Christianity’s positive formulation of the Golden Rule,
18
 as well as Islam’s, 
“Hurt no one so that none may hurt you,
19
” all share the same assumption, namely the idea that 
people are endowed with a set of natural and reciprocal rights, and that those rights deserve to be 
respected and protected.  
Assuming then that religion does believe in at least the most basic of ‘human’ rights,
20
 we can 
now return to our original query in regard to the rights of nonhumans in particular, asking 
whether or not they were also given to certain animals by God, as depicted in the most common 
religious understandings of His word.  
This article will not attempt to answer that question for all religions; it will focus only on 
Jewish law and lore. It also does not claim to represent the only strain of thought in Judaism or 
the definitive interpretation of the law; it merely sets out to revisit some of the ancient texts and 
understandings, and explore an authentic reading of what the tradition has to say on the subject 
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3. A Judaic Approach to the Concept of ‘Personhood’ 
 
3.1. Classic Tests 
 
The line between humans and non-humans was not as clear-cut in ancient times as it appears to 
be now. Throughout the discussions in rabbinic literature, we encounter part-human part-animal 






 and other monsters.
24
 When you read about 
these creatures in the Jewish sources, however, it is important to remember that the rabbis, as 
legal theorists, were not scientists, and were more interested in determining how to classify these 
beings as halachic (Jewish legal) constructs if they did or would exist, than whether or not these 
creatures actually ever existed. From their statements and rulings across the Babylonian Talmud, 
the Jerusalem Talmud, and the Midrashic lore, however, one can get a sense of the criteria the 
rabbis used in determining what exactly it is that gives a creature that elusive thing we tend to 
call humanity, or perhaps more accurately personhood, with the accompanying rights and 
benefits.  
To be sure, Judaism does recognize some of the classic tests for humanity, including but 
not limited to biology, moral intelligence, communicative ability, and, for lack of a better term 
the ‘image of God’ test.
25
 





 where humans are referred to as a yelud isha (lit. those born of woman). In describing 
Eve, the Targum Onkelos, an early and influential commentary 
28
 notes that the verse refers to 
her as “the mother of all humanity,” because she, Eve, is the progenitor of mankind; anyone born 
from Eve or her descendants is therefore considered part of mankind.
29
 This seems to argue for a 
traditional speciesist definition, and some Jewish law authorities have indeed taken that 
definition to be the determinative and even dispositive fact.
30
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25
 see below 
26
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27
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Another possible test is the ‘tzelem Elokim (lit. ‘image of God) test. Humans, we are told 
in the Bible, are created “in the image of God”
31
 which immediately raises questions from a 
Jewish perspective, as one of the most important theological premises in Judaism is that God has 
no corporeal existence. While many commentators discuss the theological implications of ‘God’s 
image,’
32
 linking the phrase to various non-physical aspects of the human being,
33
 the problem 
remains that perhaps the most influential commentator in Jewish history, Rabbi Shlomo 
Yitzchaki, (Rashi), understands the ‘image of God’ language somewhat more literally. 
According to Rashi, “the image that was prepared for him was the image of the likeness of his 
Creator,”
34




 are quick 
to clarify that even Rashi did not mean that God has a body which Adam’s could look like; some 
suggest that Adam looks not like God Himself, but like the representation of God as He appeared 
in the visions of some of the prophets.
37
 The most common explanation though is perhaps best 
expressed by the Maharal of Prague; 
38
  
...the interpretation is not that God possesses an image or form, for this is not the 
case at all. Rather, the verse informs us that when it comes to allude to what exists 
of God in a physical figure, it will illustrate a standing figure. Although certainly 
one cannot ascribe any figure, Heaven forbid, to God...nevertheless what exists of 
God is illustrated through the physical Man. 
Thus for the Maharal, and for others, even though God has no body, we can indeed speak of a 
physical correspondence between man and his Creator. Man looks like God by resembling the 
image God assumes in our own minds when we talk about His attributes. And why does the 
verse stress the point that man resembles God? Because the external resemblance reflects an 
internal likeness.
39
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Me’ahava.) They are also quick to point out that if humanity really is species driven, then any human, regardless of 
its personal abnormalities or deficiencies, would always be considered, human. Modern say commentators have 
noted that the term born here might also be descriptive, and that as we near the age of artificial wombs and 
incubators, the specieist argument might just reflect possession of human DNA, the usual way of obtaining which is 
to have been born from a woman. 
31
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32
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33
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34
 Commentary of Rahsi to Genesis 1:27 
35
 See also BT Bava Basra 58a, in which God calls Abraham, who looked like Adam, ‘the likeness of My likeness.” 
36
 See, for instance, the Baalei Tosafos in Paneiach Raza. See also Rav Natan Ashkenzai, Imrei Shefer  
37
 See, e.g. Yechezkel 1:26: "...and upon the likeness of the throne was the likeness as the appearance of a man 
above upon it." 
38
 Maharal, Derech Chaim, p. 346. Perhaps, in fact, this is the reason his name became conflated with mystical 
creationism and the figure of a man, i.e. the Golem of Prague. 
39
 Perhaps correcsponding to another test, maybe the moral intelligence test. Recall that once Adam and Eve ate 
from the Tree of Life they became “like God, knowing good and evil.”  Genesis 3:22. Another answer, 
kabbalistically based, comes from Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Pakuda, who says that there is a detailed correspondence 
between the various organs of the human body and the ten ‘sefirot’ or emanations, which God undergoes, as it were, 
before revealing His presence in this world. Each characteristic of man’s physical being represents one emanation. 
See Ramchal, Dat Tevunot 81. See also Rav Moshe ALshich’s ‘Torat Moshe,’ discussing the ‘image of God’ as 
referring to the fact that Man is God’s representation, i.e. representative, in this world, because only man can 
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The resemblance between man and his Maker is taken even to legal degrees; murder is 
considered particularly abhorrent in the Jewish tradition because man is created in God’s image, 
and by killing a man (and subtracting one of His likenesses) you lessen God’s prestige in this 
world.
40
 On the flipside, the Talmudic sage Hillel considers hygienic bathing to be an extremely 
important commandment that one must zealously perform. He compares the likeness between 
God and man to that of a King and the statues carved in his image, and notes that because man 
looks like God, he honors Him by maintaining a tidy and well kept appearance.
41
 If God creates 
humans in His image, and if murder is only ‘murder’ as we know it because man looks like God, 
then perhaps possession of human form is the simplest test for humanity.
42
  
It is important to acknowledge that the ‘image of God’ theme might be more aptly labeled 
a descriptive feature of humanity rather than a test for its essence; nowhere is it clear that this is a 
stand-alone sufficient criterion. Regardless, it is certainly the case that many of the ‘great apes,’ 
i.e. the cousin species in the biological family Hominidae, including humans, bonobos, 
chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans, look roughly the same. They also share many similar 
gestures, behaviors, and even personality quirks.
43
 
Still others have wanted to classify speech as possible halachic criteria for humanity.
44
 It 
does not seem rational to give or take away a status of personhood based on just hollow sounds 
or motions, and so the idea of speech, or more generally communication, must be a linked 
concept. Many point to a ‘moral intelligence test,’ based on the verse in Genesis
45
 which states 
that God gave man the ability to be like Him, la’daas tov vara [lit. to know (differentiate) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
perceive Him and spread His word. Later, in the medieval kabbalistic literature, many of the Golem-making 
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40
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41
 Midrash Leviticus Rabbah, 34 
42
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the offspring is not called a human only in regard to matters of ritual uncleanness.) See also BT Niddah 23b 
discussing a creatur with human form born of an animal mother. 
43
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44
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while) robots that can talk.  
45
 Genesis 3:22 (King James). 
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between good and evil].
46
 When we talk about speech as a characteristic of humanity then, what 
it means the ability to not just know, but to express to others the differentiation between good 
and evil. In this understanding the element of vocal speech specifically may not even be entirely 
necessary; the ability to speak may just be a practical test for knowledge of and ability to express 
and communicate moral intelligence, which is the real goal. A goal, by the way, that at least 
some animals are in fact quite capable of reaching.  
In The Bonobo and the Atheist,
47
 Professor Frans de Waal, C.H. Candler Professor of 
Primate Behavior at Emory University and Member of the National Academy of Sciences, 
argues that ethical behavior may in fact be biological, but it certainly isn’t only human. Indeed, 
his research in the Netherlands and at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center has shown 
that animals engage in such ‘human’ behaviors as altruism, conflict resolution, cooperation, and 
empathy. Elephants recruit friends to help them pull heavy objects, while chimpanzees refuse to 
take undeserved rewards. Bonobos comfort the loser in a fight, others animals kiss and make up 
after a disagreement, and many display gratitude and take revenge, paying back in kind for 
things done to them.
48
 
De Waal is not really the first to make these kinds of claims. Judaism has always known 
that animals demonstrate moral behavior,
49
 even noting that man could learn a lot from the 
animal kingdom in this regard.
50
 Darwin once wrote that, "any animal whatever, endowed with 
well-marked social instincts … would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as 
its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man."
51
  
All that de Wal has done is gone ahead and proved it, demonstrably, by putting on a firm 
evidential basis the fact that the roots of moral social behavior can be seen in other animals.
52
 
The other major development, of course, is that we have learned to communicate much more 
clearly with animals.
53
 It is one thing to ignore the fact that an animal looks and sounds 
distressed in a cage; it is quite another thing to be able to have a sign language conversation with 
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 See e.g. Proverbs 6:6 (King James) (“Go to the ant, though sluggard; consider her ways and be wise[.]”). 
50
 See Babylonian Talmud Eruvin 100b (Rabbi Yochanan said: Had the Torah not been given, we would have 
learned modesty from the cat, [aversion to] theft from the ant, chastity from the dove, and [conjugal] manners from 
fowl.) 
51




 Hillix, W.A. and Duane Rumbaugh. Animal Bodies, Human Minds 
54
 See Wise, Steven M. Rattling the cage: Toward legal rights for animals. Basic Books, 2000. See also Gardner, R. 
Allen, and Beatrice T. Gardner. "Teaching sign language to a chimpanzee." Science 165.3894 (1969): 664-672. 
; Premack, David. Intelligence in ape and man. Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976.See also Premack, David. "Language and 
Intelligence in Ape and Man: How much is the gap between human and animal intelligence narrowed by recent 
demonstrations of language in chimpanzees?." American Scientist 64.6 (1976): 674-683. 
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3.2. The Jerusalem Talmud’s Test 
 
Perhaps the most convincing test for humanity, and one that is often overlooked, is another 
Judaic test, the test developed in Chapter Three of Tractate Niddah in the Jerusalem Talmud. The 
Talmud states: 
 
Rabbi Yasa states in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: if [a creature] has a human 
body but its face is of an animal, it is not human; if [a creature] has an animal 
body, but its face is human, it is human.   
[And so it seems that, at first glance, what we look for are human features. But the 
Talmud continues;]   
Yet suppose it is entirely human, but its face is animal like, and it is studying 
Jewish law? Can one say to it "come and be slaughtered"? [Rather one cannot]. Or 
consider if it is entirely animal like, but its face human, and it is plowing the field 
[acting like an animal] do we come and say to it, "come and perform levirate 




The Talmudic conclusion seems to be simple. When a "creature" does not conform to the simple 
definition of humanness, i.e. born from a human mother, or even possessing human DNA, but it 
looks somewhat human, and act somewhat human, one examines the context to determine if it is 
a person. Does it study Jewish law – or, because this isn’t a matter of ‘Jewishness’ or not, this is 
a matter of general humanity, does it do differential equations, or some other act involving 
serious mental contemplation? Or is it at the pulling end of a plow?  
Even if biology remains the general default definition for the status of personhood, when 
it does not apply, and yet we still aren’t sure, then we make use of the contextual definition. 
Maybe communication, or moral intelligence, is not even a separate test at all, and is just one 
prong in the contextual question; i.e. does the creature in question exhibit human intelligence; for 
instance, does it communicate, and have knowledge? For all of the great apes, bonoboes, and 
other primates, our physical cousins who sign, and communicate, and interact like, and with, 
people, the answer here would seem to be yes. 
Again the idea that nonhumans may in fact be considered persons in some ways may at 
first seem radical, but at the end of the day it really is not. The United States has been giving 
corporations rights under the legal fiction called “corporate personhood’ since 1936 when the 
Supreme Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co.
56
 held that a newspaper corporation was 
protected by the First Amendment. As of the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari to hear an appeal in the case of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius,
57
 a Tenth Circuit decision in 
which the Appellate Court below agreed to extend religious rights to a nonhuman corporation. If 
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 297 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1936)  
57




the law can extend religion to nonhuman persons, it should not be surprising that religion can 
extend rights to nonhumans as well. 
This idea is also not that far-fetched from an internal Jewish law perspective either. 
Although the early Rabbis did not have bonoboes that could sign, they did deal with what they 
felt were border cases of humanity. The classic example is a Mishna in Tractate Kilayim,
58
 
which discusses the creatures called ‘adnei hasadeh,’ also known as a ‘yadua.’
59
 While the 
rabbinic descriptions are terse, classic commentators describes the creature as having the form of 
a man while really being an animal of the field.
60
  Maimonides notes that their speech is similar 
to that of human, but is unintelligible. Most importantly, he refers to them in his commentary to 
the Mishna as ‘al nasnas,’ which is in fact an Arabic word for monkey.
61
 The Tiferet Yisrael 
explicitly writes that these sources  refer to what we call an orangutan.
62
 
The Talmud quotes two opinions as to whether or not, from a Jewish law standpoint the 
yadua is human. While it is unclear if the two positions are in conflict (with one saying yes and 
one saying no,) or if the status is simply that these beings are somewhere in between, (i.e. 
everyone agrees that for some things they are considered people and for other things they are not, 
similar to the current status of corporations) according to at least some important 
commentators,
63
 this creature, is a full human being. In the language of the Jerusalem Talmud the 
creature is in fact referred to as a ‘bar nosh d’tor (lit. ‘a man of the mountain’).
64
 Presumably, 
this fits our earlier definition (also from the Jerusalem Talmud): it looks sort of human, and 
contextually exhibits characteristics that make it seem like a person, so we consider it a person, 
at least for some things. What we see clearly from the discussion of the adnei hasadeh is that, 
just as we established before, humanness need not be defined solely with reference to a human 
parent; it also has a clear, independent, functionality test, and either biology or context is 






In conclusion then, there really is nothing new under the sun.
66
 While trial judges in the year 
2013 may be hesitant to apply the norms of personhood to animals, the rabbis of the Talmud 
crossed that line a long time ago. In Judaism, the impulse for ethical behavior often focuses not 




 Leviticus 20:6  
60
 See Commentary of Rashi to Job 6:23 
61
 Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishbna, Kilayim 8. 
62
 Tiferet Yisrael- Yachin to Kilayim 8 
63
 See, for instance Rash Mishantz and Rav Ovadia Bartenura to the Mishna Kilayim 
64
 BT Jerusalem 8 
65
 See R. Akiva Eiger to Yoreh Deah 2, who says that monkeys cannot perform ritual slaughter not because they are 
not human, but because they are not observant Jews. Going back to our golem for a moment, see also the 
Maharasha, Chidushei Aggadot to TractateSanhedrin, who implies that if something is alive, like an animal, and 
exhibits human characteristics, we would in fact consider it human.  
66
 Ecclesiastes 1:9 
10 
 
only on the one being acted upon but also on the actor;
67
 the rabbis were perhaps more concerned 
about us becoming unmerciful people who treated intelligent beings like animals than about 
possibly extending rights too far. If the test for humanity is, as some claim, the ability to 
demonstrate and express moral intelligence, than extending legal rights to animals will not only 
make them persons- it will arguably also make all of us better persons as well. 
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 See Tur Orach Chaim 271 and commentaries ad locum. 
